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Games as frames  
By AXEL OCKENFELSa,b,*, AND UTA K. SCHIERa,b  
 
We show that economic games per se can provide contextual cues and thereby 
impact behavior. In two laboratory experiments, we examine whether deliberating 
on trust games versus stag-hunt games without feedback changes cooperation 
behavior in a subsequent game. First, we find that subjects who play trust games 
without feedback hold more pessimistic beliefs about other players’ cooperation in 
a subsequent game than subjects who played stag-hunt games without feedback. We 
also observe that deliberation on trust games versus stag-hunt games accordingly 
affects behavior in a subsequent, unrelated game. While stag-hunt games align 
interests between players, trust games pose a conflict of interest between players. 
Such (mis-)alignments induced by the game potentially explain our findings, 
because they may offer cues that affect beliefs and behavior in subsequent games. 
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Introduction 
People’s choice depends on how it is presented. This is called framing effect (1, 2). One 
important line of research shows the importance of framing in social decision making (3-15). 
For instance, framing a Prisoner’s Dilemma as a cooperation game, highlighting team decision 
making, or as a competition game, emphasizing conflicting interests amongst players, affects 
players’ willingness to cooperate (14). In this and all other cases, the game and its strategy 
spaces and payoff functions remain unchanged, yet the language that the choices are presented 
in affects game outcomes. One reason why framing matters is that language provides contextual 
cues that may influence beliefs about others’ behavior (16, 17).  
In this paper, we take a reverse approach. While keeping the natural language constant, 
we show that a game with its strategies and payoffs can per se provide contextual cues, even 
when presented in neutral terms, which subsequently affect beliefs and behavior. To illustrate 
our point, take the trust and the stag-hunt game (as shown in Figure 1), two widely-used games 
in behavioral economics and, increasingly so, in psychology (e.g. refs. 18, 19). In both games, 
two players (A and B) each decide between two options (X and Y). In the stag-hunt game, 
players choose simultaneously and may coordinate either on the payoff-dominant but riskier 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (both players choose X and receive each a payoff of 11), or 
on the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, which pays less for both players (both 
players choose Y and earn 7 each). In the trust game, the first-mover (A) has to decide whether 
Figure 1: Example of a stag-hunt game (left) and a trust game (right). 
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to trust the second-mover (X) or to end the game (Y). In case of trust, the second-mover (B) 
decides whether to reciprocate the trust (X, in which case both earn 11), or to behave selfishly 
(Y, in which case B receives 14 and A receives 4). Hence, for payoff-maximizing players, the 
trust game only knows one Nash equilibrium, in that the first-mover ends the game (and both 
players receive a payoff of 7). However, in both games, behavior is typically heterogeneous, 
and all options are chosen with positive probability (e.g. refs. 20-22).  
For our purpose, the key difference between these two games is that the stag-hunt game 
perfectly aligns interests between players, while the trust game creates a conflict of interest in 
that the first-mover has good reason to distrust the second-mover. We hypothesize that such 
(mis-)alignments induced by the game per se can serve as cues that affect the ‘mindset’ of 
players, and thus affect beliefs and behavior in subsequent choice tasks.1 Games that pose a 
conflict of interest (such as the trust game, where there is reason to distrust the second-mover) 
induce more pessimistic beliefs and more cautious behavior than games that align interests 
(such as the stag-hunt game, where there is no reason to distrust the other player). Specifically, 
we hypothesize that trustors in trust games form more pessimistic beliefs about others’ 
cooperation in a subsequent game than subjects playing stag-hunt games (which is our 
Hypothesis 1). Similarly, subjects who deliberate on others’ decision to trust subsequently 
behave more cautiously and cooperate less than subjects who deliberated on others’ stag-hunt 
game behavior (Hypothesis 2).  
                                                          
1 This is related to a literature in cognition research that has shown that human information processing differs 
under a ‘trust state of mind’ compared to a ‘distrust state of mind’. In a seminal paper, Schul, Mayo and 
Burnstein (ref. 23, p. 668) conclude from their research that “the cognitive system reacts to distrust by 
automatically inducing the consideration of incongruent associations — it seems designed to ask ‘and what if the 
information were false?’”. Further research shows that distrust increases cognitive flexibility, creativity (24, 25), 
and more elaborate information processing (26), and reduces stereotyping (27). To our knowledge, the only 
paper in economics that is related to this hypothesis (28) investigates whether betrayal aversion, typically 
ascribed to behavior in trust games, can also be found in stag-hunt games. For this, the authors disentangled 
strategic risk from natural risk in a stag-hunt game experiment, in which participants either play against a 
computer (natural risk) or a human (strategic risk). To their surprise, the authors found the opposite of betrayal 
aversion in that cooperation is higher with strategic risk, and they hypothesized (but did not provide evidence) 
that this might be due to different mindsets that are triggered by the different game forms. Our study’s 
hypotheses were developed behind this background, before we ran our experiments.  
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Other explanations for our results are in principle conceivable. However, as we will 
describe below, we carefully control for potentially confounding learning and all forms of spill-
over effects that rely on feedback. Also, cognitive learning and spill-over effects, which do not 
rely on feedback, do not easily produce the specific behavioral patterns that we observe. Indeed, 
unlike in most other previous studies of spill-over effects, the two phases in our experiment 
involve very different games and strategic reasoning. For instance, they differ in what is elicited 
(behavior versus beliefs), the number of Nash equilibria and the sequence of play (sequential 
versus simultaneous). These differences minimize the scope for simple models of spill-over of 
behaviors and beliefs, which have been shown to influence behavior across other decision 
contexts and games (29), to capture our findings.2  
We find statistically and economically strong support for both hypotheses. We conclude 
that there is no such thing as a ‘neutral’ game description. Games with aligned vs. misaligned 
incentives create per se contextual cues that in turn affect how people approach social 
interaction.  
Study 1: Effect on beliefs 
Subjects were randomly allocated to one of four treatments, which specified the content of each 
of two parts. In the first part of treatments “TgTb” and “TgSb”, subjects played five different 
trust games, whereas in the first part of treatments “SgSb” and “SgTb”, subjects played five 
                                                          
2 Another reason why we did not choose, say, a prisoners’ dilemma game to compare with the stag hunt game, is 
that the trust game arguably makes the misalignment of interests more salient (which is the key for testing our 
hypothesis). The reason is that the payoff-maximizing first-mover action in the trust game depends critically on 
the second mover’s response to trust. Thus, the first mover should be keenly interested in whether the second 
mover’s interests are (mis-)aligned when making a decision and when forming beliefs. On the other hand, in the 
standard prisoner’s dilemma game, players have a dominant strategy, and, in this sense, whether interests are 
aligned or not, as well as beliefs about the opponent’s behavior, are irrelevant for decision making. Thus, from 
this perspective, the prisoner’s dilemma game does not seem to be ideally suited for a study on how (mis)aligned 
interests affect beliefs and behavior. That said, we note that when subjects have social preferences, they will care 
about (mis)aligned incentives when playing a prisoners’ dilemma. When subjects are conditional cooperators, for 
instance, there may be two equilibria, one with mutual defection and one with mutual cooperation (see, e.g., 
Bolton and Ockenfels 1999, for an analysis; other social preference models come to similar conclusions). But the 
resulting game, when taking into account social utility, looks much like the stag hunt game, which we included 
in our study. Looking directly at the stag hunt game, instead of studying the prisoners’ dilemma, has the 
advantage for the experimenter and the subjects of not having to deal with the uncertainty about the nature and 
strength of subjects’ social preferences.  
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different stag-hunt games. In the second part, we elicited subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ 
behavior in a previously conducted experiment. Here and elsewhere, the subscript “g” indicates 
that we elicited behavior in the respective game, and the subscript “b” indicates that we elicited 
beliefs. In treatments “TgTb” and “SgTb”, subjects predicted behavior in a trust game, whereas 
in treatments “SgSb” and “TgSb” subjects predicted stag-hunt game behavior.   
For the first part of the experiment, subjects were randomly matched in pairs and 
assigned either the role of player A or player B. The structure of the games in the first part was 
similar to the games displayed in Figure 1 but the payoffs varied (Figure B3 in Appendix B 
provides more details). Before each game, players were informed of the exact payoff structure 
and then had to choose between option X and option Y. Player B in the trust game, the second-
mover, decided for the case that player A chose X. The outcome of the five games played in 
the first part was only revealed to subjects at the end of the experiment. 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects were informed that another experiment 
had been conducted some months earlier in the same laboratory with different participants. 
Subjects had to predict how many players A in the previous experiment, which took place in 
April 2017 with 134 subjects, chose option X, on a scale from 0 to 100%.  
Results: Study 1 
All statistical tests were performed at a 5% significance level, and differences in the continuous 
belief measures between subjects were tested using two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests. For our 
analyses, we considered all observations from the treatments SgSb and SgTb, but only decisions 
by the first-movers (player A) from treatments TgTb and TgSb (in sum: N = 183, with 58 
observations in SgSb, 50 in TgSb, 37 in SgTb, and 38 in TgTb).  
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Our Hypothesis 1 is strongly confirmed, both with respect to effect size and statistical 
significance.3 Beliefs about cooperation in the stag-hunt game (SgSb vs. TgSb) are much more 
optimistic when stag-hunt games were played before compared to trust games (81% vs. 59%, 
MWU: p < .0001; see Figure 2). Similarly, beliefs about trust rates in the trust game (SgTb vs. 
TgTb) are significantly higher when subjects previously played stag-hunt games compared to 
trust games (67% vs. 44%, MWU: p < .0003).4  
One potential explanation for our games-as-frames effect on beliefs is learning: Subjects in the 
first part might learn something from being exposed to the five phase 1-games, even when no 
feedback is given (see ref. 31). Since learning (if any) would seem more useful when the game 
                                                          
3 Here, we only focus on first movers in the trust games in part I. However, we find similar results for second-
movers, in that they have more pessimistic beliefs than stag-hunt game players about cooperation in a stag-hunt 
game (60% vs. 81%, MWU: p < .0002), as well as in a trust game (55% vs. 67%, MWU: p < .03).     
4 OLS regressions confirm the effect. Playing stag-hunt games compared to trust games in the first part 
significantly increases beliefs in the second part (ß_0 = 51.5, p < .001, ß_1 = 23.2, p < .001), and the effect 
remains significant if we control for which game subjects estimate in the second part. The treatment effect is 
robust to controlling for variations in the session size, as well as average profit made in the games in the first part 
(not known to subjects until the experiment is over), and if we control for age, gender, prior game theory 
knowledge and prior experience with stag-hunt and trust games. See Table S1 in the Supplementary Material for 
details.    
Notes. Estimating others’ cooperation rate (SgSb/TgSb) or trust rate (SgTb/TgTb) from 
0-100%, depending on own previous game experience with stag-hunt games (SgSb/SgTb) 
or trust games (TgSb/TgTb). P-values are from Mann-Whitney U tests, with standard 
errors bars. 
Figure 2: Games-as-frames effect on beliefs: estimating others’ behavior 
is driven by previous game experience. 
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being played in both phases is the same, this might potentially cause our treatment effect.5 
However, we find no evidence that beliefs in the treatments in which subjects predict the same 
game as they played before (treatments SgSb and TgTb) are more accurate. Specifically, we 
look at how much beliefs deviate from the true value, defined by actual behavior in the pretest. 
For beliefs about stag-hunt game behavior, we do not find that subjects’ beliefs in the treatment 
SgSb deviate in absolute terms less from the true value than in TgSb (mSgSb = 20 vs. mTgSb = 24, 
MWU: p < 0.563). Also, subjects’ beliefs in TgTb do not deviate in absolute terms less from 
the true value than beliefs in SgTb (mTgTb = 25 vs. mSgTb = 27, MWU: p < 0.625).6 
We conclude that the evidence is consistent with a games-as-frames-effect on beliefs, 
driven by the different incentive structures – aligned vs. misaligned interests – of the games per 
se. 
Study 2: Effect on behavior 
As in Study 1, the experiment consisted of two parts and subjects were randomly allocated to 
one of four treatments that we refer to as “TbTg”, “TbSg”, “SbSg”, and “SbTg”. In contrast to 
Study 1, we reversed the experimental design for Study 2: In the first part, subjects estimated 
behavior in five previously played trust games (treatments “TbTg” and “TbSg”) or stag-hunt 
games (treatments “SbSg” and “SbTg”). In the second part, subjects now played a game 
themselves, which was either a trust game (treatments “TbTg” and “SbTg”) or a stag-hunt game 
(treatments “SbSg” and “TbSg”). For the estimations in the first part, subjects estimated 
                                                          
5 In principle, there might also be spillover effects across different games. Evidence shows that proposers in 
repeated ultimatum games learn not only from playing the same game but also from playing other games (32). 
Experiencing trustworthiness in repeated trust games with a partners matching seems to spill over to trust 
behavior in a subsequent trust game with strangers matching (33). Similarly, trust behavior might not be driven 
by stable preferences but can be affected by experiencing fair und unfair treatment in a previous, unrelated game 
34). Moreover, cooperation in infinitely repeated Prisoners’ dilemmas can spill over to more prosocial behavior 
in subsequent ultimatum games, dictator games, trust games and public good games (35). Similarly, successful 
coordination can spill over from median-effort to minimum effort games (36). However, in all these studies, 
spillover effects in behavior or beliefs rely on feedback about other players’ behavior, which in our case is ruled 
out by design. But even if feedback would have been given, the overall behavioral pattern that we find is not 
explained by systematic spill-over of trust(worthiness) or any other given first phase experiences.   
6 Neither is the compound difference significant (mSgSb+TgTb = 22 vs. mTgSb_SgTb = 26, MWU: p < 0.223).  
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previous behavior in the five games played in Study 1. For the second part, subjects were 
matched in pairs and assigned the role of player A or B, and then played one of the games from 
Figure 1.  
Results: Study 2 
All statistical differences in behavior in the games between subjects are tested using two-sided 
Fisher’s exact tests, as behavior is a binary measure. For our analyses, we consider all 
observations from the treatments SbSg and TbSg, but only decisions by first-movers (player A) 
in the trust game in treatments SbTg and TbTg (in total: N = 205, with 58 observations in SbSg, 
58 in TbSg, 46 in SbTg, and 43 in TbTg).7  
In line with our second hypothesis, we observe that the kind of game subjects estimate 
in the first part of the experiment strongly affects game behavior in the second part. As 
illustrated in Figure 3, subjects substantially cooperate more in the stag-hunt game, when they 
previously deliberated on stag-hunt games than on trust games (74% vs. 45%, FET: p < .003). 
Similarly, first-movers in the trust game trust more, when they previously estimated stag-hunt 
games compared to trust games (67% vs. 40%, FET: p < .012).8 
Similar to Study 1, we examined whether there is a learning effect in the sense that 
subjects in the treatments SbSg and TbTg have an advantage over subjects in the treatments 
SbTg and TbSg. However, we find no evidence that the beliefs within the first part become 
more accurate in TbTg/SbSg compared to SbTg/TbSg from the first to the fifth game (i.e. 
                                                          
7 For second-movers in the trust game, we find that second-movers behave more trustworthy when they 
previously deliberated on stag-hunt games than on trust games (61% vs. 37%, FET: p < .022).  
8 Probit regression support the results. Estimating stag-hunt games compared to trust games in the first part 
significantly increases cooperation in the second part (ß_0 = 0.19, p < .137, ß_1 = 0.75, p < .001). Moreover, this 
effect is robust to controlling for the kind of game subjects play in the second part, and to controlling for 
variations in session sizes, as well as for belief (in-)accuracy in the first part (ß_1= -0.55, p < .002), which might 
be interpreted as how rational subjects’ expectations about others are. Lastly, we added age, gender, prior game 
theory knowledge and prior experience with stag-hunt and trust games as control variables, but, none of these 
variables significantly determine behavior, nor do they eliminate the games-as-frames effect on behavior. See 
Table S2 in the Supplementary Material for details.   
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accuracy improvement from game 1 to game 5: mSbSg/TbTg = -0.04, mSbTg/TbSg = -0.03, MWU: p 
= 0.571).9    
Furthermore, in the second part subjects do not seem to make “better” (i.e. expected 
value maximization) decisions in treatments SbSg/TbTg than in treatments SbTg/TbSg. For 
this, we analyzed whether subjects maximized their expected value if they had rational 
expectations about the second-movers’ behavior. In the trust game treatments, 37% of second-
movers in TbTg chose option X, compared to 61% of second-movers in SbTg. Hence, first-
movers in TbTg with rational expectations about second-movers should prefer option Y 
(EVA(Y) = 7 > EVA(X) = 6.6 = 0.37*11+0.63*4), whereas first-movers in SbTg should prefer 
option X (EVA(Y) = 7 < EVA(X) = 8.3 = 0.61*11+0.39*4). If we look at the share of player A 
that actually choose the preferred option, we do not find that first-movers in TbTg make more 
payoff maximizing decisions than in SbTg (60.5% in TbTg vs. 67.4% in SbTg, FET: p = .516). 
Similarly, in the stag-hunt game treatments players in SbSg chose on average option X with 
74% compared to 45% of players in TbSg. Thus, players in SbSg with rational expectations 
about their partners’ behavior should prefer option X (EV(Y) = 7 < EV(X) = 8.4 = 
                                                          
9 See Supplementary Material for more information on belief accuracy. 
Notes. Cooperation rate (SbSg/TbSg) and trust rate (SbTg/TbTg), depending on previous 
deliberation on stag-hunt games (SbSg/SbTg) or trust games (TbSg/TbTg). P-values are 
from Fisher’s exact tests. 
Figure 3: Games-as-frames effect on behavior: cooperation rates by 
players driven by previous game experience. 
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0.74*11+0.26*1), whereas players in TbSg should prefer option Y (EV(Y) = 7 > EV(X) = 5.5 = 
0.45*11+0.55*1). However, we do not observe that players in SbSg choose the ‘better’ option 
more often than players in TbSg (74.1% in SbSg vs. 55.2% in TbSg, FET: p < .052). 
Consequently, we conclude that there is no evidence that subjects in treatments SbSg/TbTg 
have a learning advantage over subjects in SbTg/TbSg.       
Conclusion 
It is well-known that the natural language which describes a given game provides contextual 
cues that affect and guide people’s behavior. We show that the game’s strategies and payoffs 
per se also provide such cues. There is no such thing as a ‘neutral’ game. Games with aligned 
versus misaligned incentives inevitably frame the decision context in different ways, with 
important consequences for subsequent beliefs and behavior. The different games offer 
different cues which evoke different information processing modes in terms of a trust or distrust 
mindset, as suggested by cognition research (23). Second-movers in our trust game have more 
pessimistic beliefs about others after deliberating on misaligned interests of trust games (Study 
1). Moreover, they behave less trustworthily (Study 2) even though they do not face any 
strategic uncertainty. This suggests that trust and distrust mindsets do not only affect beliefs 
about others’ behavior but also preferences. That is, games are per se inherently intertwined 
with belief and preference formation. 
 The systematic and non-trivial pattern of behavior and beliefs in the second phase in 
response to being exposed to the respective first phase is well-organized by our hypotheses, 
which in turn are based on recently established findings in social cognition but cannot be easily 
captured by spill-over mechanisms that have been observed before. That said, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that there are other, probably additional cognitive mechanisms at work; 
it would thus be useful to test our hypotheses also with more direct measures for the underlying 
mechanisms and of the associated mindsets. We leave this to future research.  
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Methods 
Study 1: 258 university students were recruited via ORSEE (37) and invited to an experiment 
at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research in May 2017, programmed with zTree (38). 
By accepting to participate in our experiments the subjects, who sign up voluntarily, agree to 
the norms and rules of an experiment within our laboratory. Students came from various 
disciplines, with a mean age of 23 (sd = 2.89) and 57% being female. They earned on average 
13.16 EUR for 40 minutes of participation (including a 4.00 EUR show-up fee).  For the 
estimations in second part of the experiment, subjects were informed that another experiment 
had been conducted some months earlier in the same laboratory with different participants. We 
told subjects that participants from a previous experiment were randomly matched in pairs and 
assigned a role of player A or B, and then played the game illustrated in Figure 1. Estimations 
of subjects were incentivized by a quadratic scoring rule (39, 40), so that subjects could earn an 
amount between 0.20€ and 1.00€ depending on the accuracy of their estimation.10 At the end 
of the experiment, subjects answered a short questionnaire about their demographic 
background, before we revealed the outcome of the five games played in the first part and the 
accuracy of their estimation in the second part. For subjects’ final payoff, one of the five games 
from the first part was randomly selected and paid out, in addition to earnings from the second 
part.  
Study 2: We recruited 294 university students via ORSEE (37) for an experiment at the 
Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research in September 2017, programmed with zTree (38). 
By accepting to participate in our experiments the subjects, who sign up voluntarily, agree to 
the norms and rules of an experiment within our laboratory. Students were on average 24 years 
old (sd = 4.11) and 64% were female. They earned on average 13.02 EUR for 40 minutes of 
                                                          
10 Subjects were incentivized according to the following rule: 𝜋𝜋 = 1 − 0.8 ∗ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 −
𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎)2. 
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participation, including a 4.00 EUR show-up fee.11 In Study 2, subjects first made five 
estimations about behavior in previous experiments, and then played a trust or stag-hunt game 
themselves. For the estimations in the first part, subjects were given instructions analogue to 
Study 1. For the second part, subjects played one of the games displayed in Figure 1. Finally, 
subjects answered a short questionnaire on demographics, and then received information about 
the accuracy of their five estimations in the first part, the outcome of the game in the second 
part, and their final payoffs. For subjects‘ payoffs, one of the five estimations from the first part 
was randomly selected and paid out, as well as the game from the second part.  
 
Data availability: 
Additional information may be found in the Online Appendix for this article on the publisher’s 
website. This includes the complete data set in .dta format, all statistical analyses in a do-file 
format, and the code for conducting the experiment using the experimental software z-tree. 
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Dependent = beliefs about previous 
cooperation rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
23.2***  22.6***  23.4***  26.0***
(4.00) (3.86) (4.46) (4.45)
  14.4***   14.7***   13.3***
(3.80) (3.91) (3.87)
 -0.2  -0.2
(0.38) (0.38)








   1.2
(0.66)
 51.5*** 44.4***  47.7***  22.4
(3.07) (3.51) (8.14) (18.46)
Observations 183 183 183 183





Prior participation in similar studies
Trust mindset (playing SHGs)
Estimating previous SHG
Session size
Mean profit from games
Table S1: Determinants of beliefs about others’ behavior in previous experiments (Study 1).  
Notes. Results from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses. Trust mindset = dummy variable for 
playing stag-hunt games in the first part (baseline: trust game); Estimating previous SHG = dummy variable for 
estimating behavior of previous stag-hunt game players in second part (baseline = of trust game players); Mean 
profit = average profit from playing games in the first part (revealed to subjects after belief elicitation); Game 
theory knowledge = dummy variable with no previous knowledge of game theory as baseline; Prior participation 
= dummy variable with no prior experience in playing stag-hunt or trust games as baseline; Female = dummy 
variable with male as baseline; Age = continuous self-reported variable. P-values: *** ≤ .001, ** ≤.01, * ≤.05. 






Study 2: Analysis of belief inaccuracy in the first part 
Subjects in Study 2 estimated previous stag-hunt game behavior more accurately than previous trust 
game behavior (average_inaccuracySbSg/SbTg = 21, average_inaccuracyTbTg/TbSg = 27, MWU: p < .0001). 
When we regress behavior in the second part on the inaccuracies of beliefs in the first part, a Probit 
regression suggests that less accurate beliefs decrease cooperation in the second part (𝛽𝛽0= 0.99, p < .001, 
𝛽𝛽1 = -0.67, p < .001). Thus, it seems that the better subjects are in estimating other players’ behavior in 
previous games, the more cooperative they behave afterwards in a stag-hunt or trust game. Moreover, 
the accuracy of beliefs significantly interacts with our games-as-frames effect, in the sense that less 
accurate beliefs in the first part seem to decrease the games-as-frames effect (𝛽𝛽0= -0.31, p < .389, 
𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏_𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0.09, p < .718, 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 2.09, p < .001, 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖_𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 = -1.22, p < .002). 
 
Dependent = cooperation in stag-hunt 
or trust game (1) (2) (3) (4)
 0.75***  0.75***  0.64***  0.61***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
  0.17   0.30   0.40
(0.18) (0.23) (0.23)
 -0.01  -0.01
(0.38) (0.38)










 -0.19 -0.28  0.62   1.03
(0.13) (0.16) (0.19) (0.83)
Observations 205 205 205 205
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.13
Constant
Prior participation in similar studies
Female
Age
Trust mindset (estimating SHGs)




Table S2: Determinants of cooperation behavior (Study 2).  
Notes. Results from Probit regressions with standard errors in parentheses. Trust mindset = dummy variable for 
estimating others’ behavior in previous stag-hunt games in the first part (baseline: previous trust games); Playing a 
subsequent SHG = dummy variable for playing a stag-hunt game in the second part (baseline = a trust game); 
Session size = controlling for number of players in each session; Belief inaccuracy = sum of belief deviations in 
first part; Game theory knowledge = dummy variable with no previous knowledge of game theory as baseline; Prior 
participation = dummy variable with no prior experience in playing stag-hunt or trust games as baseline; Female = 
dummy variable with male as baseline; Age = continuous self-reported variable. P-values: *** ≤ .001, ** ≤.01, * 
≤.05. 
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Appendix A1. Experimental Instructions for Study 1 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully and from now on, please do not communicate with other 
participants. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and we will come 
to you and answer your questions.  
In this experiment, you can earn money. How much you can earn, depends on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants. Regardless of this, you will receive 4 EUR for showing-up to the 
experiment. At the end of the experiments, all earnings from the experiment will be added, and paid out 
to you in EUR.  
Your decisions during the experiment are anonymous. In addition, your earnings will be kept in 
confidence. 
During the experiment, we ask you to turn off your cell phone and to store it out of reach. All documents 
not related to the experiment (lecture notes, books, etc.) must not be used. Breach of the rules can lead 
to exclusion from the experiment and all payments.  
On the next page, you are given instructions on the experimental procedure. The experiment starts, as 
soon as all participants have read and understood the instructions.  
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE  
 
In this experiment, there are two types of participants: player A and player B. At the beginning, it will 
be determined randomly whether you are player A or player B and you will be informed about this.   
 
Every player A will be randomly assigned a player B. Both players, each have to choose between two 
options, X or Y. [added for treatments TgTb/TgSb: First, player A decides. Then, player B decides, 
without knowing player A’s decision.] 
For each pair of players, payoffs depend on which options both players choose.  
For example:  
 
 
Payoff table [for treatments SgSb/SgTb] 
If both player choose option X: Both players get …€ 
If player A chooses option X, and player B chooses option Y: A gets …€ and B gets …€ 
If player A chooses option Y, and player B chooses option X: A gets …€ and B gets …€ 
If both player choose option Y: Both players get …€ 
Payoff table [for treatments TgTb/TgSb] 
If player A chooses option Y (independent of player B’s choice): Both players get …€ 
If both player choose option X: Both players get …€ 
If player A chooses option X, and player B chooses option Y: A gets …€ and B gets …€ 
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The exact amounts paid […€] vary per round. In total, there are five rounds.  
At the beginning of each round, you will see a payoff table, as the one displayed above, that will inform 
you about the exact amounts paid. After that, you have to decide whether you want to choose option X 
or option Y.  
 
The decisions from your partner will only be revealed to you at the end of the experiment. This means 
between rounds, you do not receive any information about your payoff from the previous round.  
 
For your earnings, one round will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment.  
 
 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive another question. You will see a similar payoff table to 
the one above and have to estimate how players from a previous experiment behaved in this game. This 
experiment was conducted last month in this laboratory with different participants.  
 
For your estimation you have to choose an integer between 0 and 100%. Your payoff for your estimation 
depends on how accurate your estimation was: 
𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 1 − 0,8 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2 
The deviation is the difference between your estimation and the actual behavior of players from the 
previous experiment: 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = |𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎| 
 
This means that the better you estimate the behavior of the previous players, the higher your payoff will 
be. Your payoff will be between 0.20€ and 1.00€.  
 
Finally, we ask you to fill out a short questionnaire. After that you will learn about the results of the five 
games, as well as about how accurate your estimation was. At the end, you will receive an overview of 
your total earnings from the experiment.   
 
If you have any questions about the instructions, please raise your hand and we will come to you.  
 
 
Appendix A2. Experimental Instructions for Study 2 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Welcome to the experiment! 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully and from now on, please do not communicate with other 
participants. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and we will come 
to you and answer your questions.  
In this experiment, you can earn money. How much you can earn, depends on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants. Regardless of this, you will receive 4 EUR for showing-up to the 
experiment. At the end of the experiments, all earnings from the experiment will be added, and paid out 
to you in EUR.  
Your decisions during the experiment are anonymous. In addition, your earnings will be kept in 
confidence. 
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During the experiment, we ask you to turn off your cell phone and to store it out of reach. All documents 
not related to the experiment (lecture notes, books, etc.) must not be used. Breach of the rules can lead 
to exclusion from the experiment and all payments.  
On the next page, you are given instructions on the experimental procedure. The experiment starts, as 
soon as all participants have read and understood the instructions.  
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE  
 
This experiment consists of two parts.  
 
In the first part, you are asked to make estimations about how players behaved in five previous 
experiments. These experiments were conducted last month in this laboratory with different participants.  
 
In each experiment, there were two types of participants: player A and player B. Types were randomly 
determined and participants were informed about their type at the beginning of the experiment. Every 
player A was randomly assigned a player B. Both players, each had to choose between two options, X 
or Y. [added for treatments TbTg/TbSg: First, player A decided. Then, player B decided, without 
knowing player A’s decision.] 
 
For each pair of players, payoffs depended on which options both players chose:  
For example:  
 
 
Your task is to estimate how player A in five of these previous experiments behaved. The exact amounts 
paid […€] varied between the five experiments. Before each estimation, you will see a payoff table that 
will inform you about the exact amounts paid.  
 
For each estimation, you have to choose an integer between 0 and 100%. Your payoff for an estimation 
depends on how accurate your estimation was: 
𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 1 − 0,8 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2 
The deviation is the difference between your estimation and the actual behavior of players from the 
previous experiment: 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = |𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎| 
 
This means that the better you estimate the behavior of the previous players, the higher your payoff will 
be. Your payoff can be between 0.20€ and 1.00€.  
 
For your earnings, one of the five estimations will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment.  
Payoff table [for treatments SbSg/SbTg] 
If both player choose option X: Both players get …€ 
If player A chooses option X, and player B chooses option Y: A gets …€ and B gets …€ 
If player A chooses option Y, and player B chooses option X: A gets …€ and B gets …€ 
If both player choose option Y: Both players get …€ 
Payoff table [for treatments TbTg/TbSg] 
If player A chooses option Y (independent of player B’s choice): Both players get …€ 
If both player choose option X: Both players get …€ 
If player A chooses option X, and player B chooses option Y: A gets …€ and B gets …€ 
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In the second part of the experiment, you will play a game yourself. Again, there will be player A and 
player B. You will be informed about your type at the beginning of the second part. Types are randomly 
determined, and each player A is randomly assigned a player B. Both, player A and B, have to choose 
between two options, X and Y. For each pair of players, payoffs depend on which options both players 
choose. For this, you will see a payoff table, similar to the one illustrated above that will inform you 
about the exact payoffs for the second part.  
 
 
Finally, we ask you to fill out a short questionnaire. After that you will learn about the results of the 
game in the second part, as well as about how accurate your estimations in the first part were. At the 
end, you will receive an overview of your total earnings from the experiment.   
 
If you have any questions about the instructions, please raise your hand and we will come to you.  
 
 
Appendix B. Experimental Screens 
 Figure B1: Exemplary screens for the first part of Study 1 (left: treatments SgSb and SgTb, right: 
treatments TgTb and TgSb).  
 
 
Figure B2: Exemplary screens for the second part of Study 1 (left: treatments SgSb and TgSb, right: 
treatments TgTb and SgTb).  
 
 
For Study 2, the zTree-screens looked similar, but the order of the two parts was reversed. In the first 
part, subjects estimated behavior from the five games played in part I of Study 1. In the second part, 
subjects made a choice for the games displayed in Figure 1.     







Figure B3: Exact payoffs for the games played in the first part of Study 1 and estimated in the first 
part of Study 2.  
 
